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The health emergency1 that has been affecting our planet for several 
months has already 6,663,304 confirmed cases of COVID-19, 
including 392,802 deaths, reported to World Health Organization2. 
These results were unavoidable even though the measures and actions 
taken by different countries, aimed to lower the infection flow and also 
to prevent any possible overburdening of the hospital centers, based on 
their capacities. The need to guarantee the monitoring of the flows of 
circulation and the spread of contagion at various levels, brought drastic 
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1 Among the first commentators of recent government measures, see V. BALDINI, 
Health emergency and state of prevention, in fundamental rights. it, n. 1/2020; C. 
BUZZACCHI, Coronavirus and territories: the differentiated regionalism coincides 
with the yellow zone, in the constitution.info, 2 March 2020; G. AZZARITI, The 
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restrictions on people and the economy of entire territories, would seem 
prima facie attributable to the state of undisputed emergency. 
It is important to mention that the reaction was immediate, as it was 
responding to a real and serious risk. States found themselves 
unprepared due to the lack of information on COVID-19 and were 
forced to keep the issue of the measures taken always on focus, to 
change them according to the degree of risk3. 
It has therefore been asked whether the choice made by certain 
Governments ensures the respectful observance of the provisions 
dictated by Constitutions, by way as an example the Italian one, or if the 
conflict, which occurred in an exceptional emergency context, manifests 
the first symptoms of a latent return to various autonomous and 
independent power centers also regarding the limitation of personal 
freedoms on the sensu side4 guaranteed by the fundamental Card. 
It cannot be denied that in Europe, Italy constituted the leading country 
in the fight against pandemic COVID 19 and that the restrictive 
measures adopted by the country were the reference point for 
containment policies, followed by numerous European and overseas 
countries. 
Although the interest of the various doctrinal currents of thought has 
focused more on the legal instruments through which the various 
Governments have come to the choice of significantly limiting the 
                                                 
3 V.PELLIGRA, Covid, the crisis that we could have imagined and the importance of risk,  on 
www.ilsole24ore.com, 31 May 2020 
4 F.M.STORELLI, The gradual limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the coronavirus 
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aforementioned fundamental freedoms5, he focus of this paper is the 
delicate relationship between personal freedoms and the need to protect 
primarily the health of an entire state community. 
The declaration of the state of emergency by the World Health 
Organization has prompted governments to take clear and unequivocal 
positions aimed at giving significant importance to public health, to the 
detriment of the rights attributed to the individual, but it has left to the 
States the freedom to establish quid and quomodo6 of containment of the 
virus.  
States are faced with two main dilemmas related to the public interest: in 
primis, to provide immediate and careful health care for infected people 
and maximum restriction of their liberty, in secundis to restrict the 
freedom and other rights associated with it, to protect the population, 
reducing as much as possible the number of infected. 
Between them, the states chose to apply both measures, in order to have 
a modus Vivendi between the real situation of COVID-19 and the 
consequences that could bring in the future. In any case, declaring a state 
of emergency, or emergency, would allow states to act with these 
measures, considering them legal. But has that been the response of 
states to COVID-19, constitutional and in line with the European 
Convention on Human Rights? 
                                                 
5 L.CUOCOLO, Constitutional rights in the face of the Covid-19 emergency: a comparative 
perspective, Covid-19 Emergency Observatory, , on www.federalismi.it, 05  May 2020. 
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In Albania like in other countries, the freedom rights that were limited 
are divided in: the freedoms and rights related to work; to movement; to 
health; to personal and private life; to education. 
In terms of international law7, the pandemic shows how important a 
global government would be. It would seem that, from a still limping 
idea of global constitutionalism8, there is the intention of a political and 
cultural initiative for a new international order9. 
In terms of supranational law10, all the mediocrities of a European 
integration process not yet concluded emerge without a shadow of a 
doubt. Furthermore, the economic-financial system11, with a single 
currency and multiple sovereign debts, is more evident than ever, in its 
maximum expression, as the virus of inequalities within the Union12, 
where terms such as inclusive citizenship13 are increasingly moving away 
                                                 
7 C.CARUSO, G.LATTANZI, G.LUCCIOLI and M.LUCIANI,The pandemic also attacks 
the law? Interview with by Franco De Stefano on www.giustiziainsime.it, 2 April 2020. 
8F.SPERANZA, interview with L.FERRAJOLI, A stronger global Constitution of the markets 
on  www.osservatoreromano.va 17April 2020. 
9 A.MINUTO RIZZO, A hypothetical international order after Covid-19 on 
www.affariinternazionali.it, 7April  2020. 
10 Ibidem C.CARUSO, G.LATTANZI, G.LUCCIOLI and M.LUCIANI,The pandemic 
also attacks the law? Interview with by Franco De Stefano  on www.giustiziainsime.it, 2 April 
2020. 
11 Annex 1 - Fiscal sovereignty of individual Member States within the 
framework of European federal integration: elimination of "Tax Havens" in the 
Union and transition to a European federal tax system, Accademia dei Lincei, 
Covid-19 Commission document on www.lincei.it, 9 May 2020. 
12 A.STOCCHIERO, Inequalities in the time of the coronavirus, , on www.focsiv.it,30 March 
2020. 
13 E.SANTORO, From inclusive citizenship to excluding citizenship: the role of prison in the 
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from pro-European dream. In terms of domestic law, in Italy the 
fundamental issues, concern rights and the structure of powers14. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Albania provides in Article 17 15 
that: Limitations of the rights and freedoms provided for in this 
Constitution may be established only by law, in the public interest or for 
the protection of the rights of others. A limitation shall be in proportion 
to the situation that has dictated it. This provision requires the 
fulfillment of certain conditions to realize the restriction of fundamental 
rights and freedoms, where the most important of them is related to the 
fact that the restriction should be done only by law. To justify from a 
constitutional point of view, touching on the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual, it is necessary the intervention of the state, 
depending on the nature of the law, the character of the public interest 
to be protected, the concrete circumstances that dictate the intervention 
to a minimum and as less harmful as possible from the point of view of 
human rights16. 
It is interesting to note that in this case, the formula used was not that of 
a law passed in the assembly, but initially the state of pandemic in 
Albania, was declared by order of the Ministry of Health and Social 
                                                 
14 F.GATTA, COVID-19: the framework of the emergency system,  on www.iusinitinere.it, 27 
March 2020. 
15 Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Article 17 1. Limitations of the rights and 
freedoms provided for in this Constitution may be established only by law, in the public 
interest or for the protection of the rights of others. A limitation shall be in proportion 
to the situation that has dictated it. 2. These limitations may not infringe the essence of 
the rights and freedoms and in no case may exceed the limitations provided for in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Inclusion17. Through this act it was declared the state of pandemic in 
Albania due to COVID-19. This act was enough to start closing the 
education institutions in Albania, to take measures regarding the health 
institutions dedicated to infected patient. Other acts followed this Order 
and it was finalized with the Decision of the Council of Ministers, nr. 
243 dated 24.03.2020 “On the declaration of the state of natural 
disaster”18.  
The European governments have adopted measures to combat the virus, 
activating systems which derogate from the ordinary rules of action and 
intervention, given the extraordinary nature of the emergency moment 
faced. 
This event has demonstrated the incompleteness19 of the European 
constitutional path, unable to face the emergency in a uniform way, 
providing the Member States with common lines of action, although 
considering the territorial, political and sociological differences present in 
the European Union. 
                                                 
17 Order nr. 15 dated 10.03.2020 of Minister of Health and Social Inclusion. 
18 The normative act it is based on article 101 of the Constitution of Albania, provided 
that the Council of Ministers, in case of necessity and emergency, may take temporary 
measures through normative acts, having the force of law. These acts must be 
immediately submitted to the Assembly which is convened within 5 days if it is not in 
session and it is does not approve them within 45 days these acts lose force 
retroactively. 
19 G.MICHELINI, EU and pandemic, health shock and integration, on 
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It is interesting to highlight the rigidity of the containment measures 
adopted by China20 which through a decision, defined by the WHO itself 
"unprecedented", has drastically reduced fundamental freedoms, 
aggravating the position of any violators with the threat of the death 
penalty, as well as with an unacceptable limitation of freedom of 
expression, certainly not shared by democratic states. 
However, the parallel confrontation with Western democracies has 
raised concerns about the opportunity to review the extent of the powers 
of intervention recognized to the various democratic governments faced 
with the need to protect public health in a prevalent way. 
The question that arises is whether the pandemic has also attacked21 the 
law. 
No social or natural phenomenon is in itself indifferent to the law, which 
can always make it an object of regulation where this is logically possible. 
On the contrary, there is no social and natural phenomenon that is not 
potentially capable of affecting the law. In the case of a pandemic, the 
reflection deserves a comparison on a multilevel plane that sees 
                                                 
20 February 18 2020 :Intentionally hiding or incorrectly reporting symptoms related to 
coronavirus is an offense that could result in the death penalty, according to a notice 
issued on February 15, 2020 by a Chinese court. Hiding a travel trip could also be a 
crime, the warning adds. Any resident responsible for further spreading the COVID-19 
virus may be accused of the crime of endangering public safety by dangerous means, 
the Beijing Daily newspaper wrote. "In extreme cases," added the Beijing Daily, 
violators "could be sentenced to 10 years in prison, life imprisonment or death." The 
Chinese National Health Commission also introduced bans on February 15 against 
anyone with a cough, fever or any other disease of traveling by road, rail or air. On 
www.nessunotocchicaino.it. 
21 Ibidem C.CARUSO, G.LATTANZI, G.LUCCIOLI and M.LUCIANI, The 
pandemic also attacks the law? Interview with by Franco De Stefano on 
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international law, supranational law and, finally, internal law as 
protagonist. 
Some observations are needed. 
First of all, it is evident that the relations of permanent dialogue between 
the Government and Parliament have failed, so much so that one 
wonders, precisely, if the government operators themselves, one 
hundred people, had certain immunity at Covid-19 respect to certain 
Members of Parliament. On this point, Legislative Decree 19 was 
certainly not helpful. 
Secondly, the tension between the various levels of government cannot 
fail to be noticed. This refers to the relationship between the State and 
the Regions22. The d.l. n. 19 of 25 March made the picture even more 
cumbersome. At first, it was quite clear that according to the legislative 
decree n. 6, the regional ordinances could have intervened only pending 
the d.P.C.M. Subsequently, those entered into force were reserved, 
admitting a regional derogatory intervention of excessively undetermined 
scope. 
Well, already in 2003 the Constitutional Court, with the sentence n.30723, 
had already ruled how the most rigorous regional health protection 
                                                 
22 Ex multis F. FABRIZZI, A de constitutionalized conflict or a politicized conflict? Reading the 
sent. 259/2019 on a conflict between entities that resembles a conflict between powers, in the Forum 
of Constitutional Notebooks, 1, 2020, on www.forumcostituzionale.it, Dossier 1/2020. 
23 Q.CAMERLENGO, The new constitutional structure of the legislative functions between 
intangible balances and substantial legality (Note to the Court of the Constitution 307/2003), on 
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measures interfere with essential national interests and that these should 
be balanced24 by the state legislature. Historia non est magistra vitae. 
Finally, the question arose as to what the relationship between collective 
interests and individual rights was. 
Considering, for example, the right to personal liberty, codified in article 
5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the provision 
provides that no one can be imprisoned, subject to a number of 
exceptions, including regular detention of a person likely to spread a 
contagious disease”. The European Court of Human Rights, an 
independent body charged with supervising the application of the 
ECHR, has had the opportunity to provide an authentic interpretation of 
the norm25. 
In making their assessment, the judges took into account factors such as 
the length of the period of detention, the danger of the disease, both in 
relation to the ease of the contagion, and the symptoms that it can give, 
and the availability of other measures less harmful to individual freedom, 
useful to face the situation. Given the rate of contagion, the number of 
deaths caused by Covid-19, and the serious difficulties of many States in 
curbing the epidemic, the hospitalization or quarantine measures 
                                                 
24 V.LOPILATO and G,CORSO, Il Diritto Amministrativo dopo le riforme costituzionali, 
Parte Speciale, Volume II, Giuffrè Editore, Milano,pg.21. 
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adopted by different States would seem not to differ with the 
requirements set by the article 5 of the ECHR26. 
To influence the complexity of the analysis, the interpretative criteria 
developed by the ECHR cooperate in the exegetical development of the 
Convention. One of them wants each limitation clause27 to be 
interpreted restrictively and so that the introduced measure does not 
affect the “essence” of the law itself28. 
In addition, some of the provisions require that the limitations are 
necessary “in a democratic society.” This implies for national authorities 
to prove that the individual measures do not go to affect the underlying 
principles of the democratic functioning of the state. 
The exceptionality that characterized the government systems has not 
been considered in the same way by all the Community institutions. On 
the one hand, in fact, both the European Central Bank and the 
European Commission29 have put in place economic aid capable of 
allowing a slow recovery of the productive activities of the states, 
severely compromised by the forced lockdown imposed by the 
pandemic30. 
                                                 
26 E.SOMMARIO, Coronavirus contrast measures and respect for human rights, , on 
www.affariinternazionali.it, 29 March 2020. 
27 E.SOMMARIO, Measures to contrast the epidemic and human rights, between ordinary 
limitations and derogations, 27 March 2020, on www.sidiblog.org, 27 March 2020.  
28 S.VAN DROOGHENBROECK and C.RIZCALLAH, The ECHR and the essence of 
fundamental rights: the search for sugar in hot milk?, on www.cambridge.org, Dossier 20, 04 
September 2019. 
29 To see  Monetary policy decisions, , on www.ecb.europa.eu, 4 June 2020 
30 M.CASTELLANETA,Bundesverfassungsgericht against the EU Court or against Europe?, on 
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On the other hand, however, the European Court of Justice has 
continued to operate in an ordinary regime, failing to recognize the 
difficulties that emerged from managing an unusual situation dictated by 
the emergency, thus also imposing convictions against countries 
infringing Union rules. 
This attitude, of course, runs counter to the well-known solidarity clause 
which, by imposing support behavior towards member countries in 
difficulty, also weighs on the institutions, which must make up for the 
deficiencies found at national level31, in accordance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality that have always animated relations 








                                                 
31 M.BELLOCCI and P.PASSAGLIA, The protection of weak subjects as an explanation in the 
constitutional law, on www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
32 See on Thematic notes on the European Union, The subsidiarity principle on 
www.europarl.europa.eu 
